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'Tis an awkward thing to play with souls.
-Robert

Browning"

I. INTRODUCTION

In a recent article, I examined some of the legal and social issues
relating to the conception of a child through insemination using frozen
sperm from the child's dead father.' Among other things, I argued that
the laws should allow those so conceived to inherit property via will or
intestacy from the father, just as would traditionally-conceived children.2 Moreover, I suggested that pretermitted child statutes might be
used to include as takers those posthumously-conceived children not
mentioned in the will of a father dying testate
In a more general sense, my previous article argued for financial
responsibility to be imposed on the estate of the father of posthumouslyconceived children.' In the case of anonymous sperm donation from a
male who has elected not to be a father, I asked for some financial
accountability on the part of the woman wishing to use the anonymous
donor's frozen sperm to conceive.5 Given the difficulties society already
faces regarding accidental single motherhood, it seemed to me that
elective single motherhood should be regulated at least to this extent. In
a situation in which no father or his estate will be financially accountable and where society is already burdened by thousands of unwanted
or orphaned children awaiting adoption, such regulation-in the best
interests of the child-seemed appropriate.
When news first broke of Ian Wilmut's cloning of an adult sheep to
create "Dolly,"'6 I immediately began to wonder how law and society

** ROBERT BROWNING, A LIGHT WOMAN (1855), reprintedin THE COMPLETE POETICAL
WORKS OF ROBERT BROWNING 267 (1940).
1. See generallyRonald Chester, Freezing the HeirApparent: A Dialogueon Postmortem
Conception, ParentalResponsibility, and Inheritance, 33 HOuS. L. REv. 967 (1996) (arguing
in favor of maternal and paternal financial responsibility for children born through artificial
methods of procreation).
2. See id. at 1012-16.
3. See id. at 1014.
4. See id. at 1014-16.

5. See id. at 1015-16.
6. See Scientists at the Roslin Institute Publish Scientific Breakthrough (last modified
Feb. 26, 1997) <http:llwww.ri.bbsrc.ac.ukllibrary/researchlcloned.html>. In its official press
release, the Roslin Institute, on February 24, 1997, announced the publication in NATURE of
Wilmut and his team's "successful breeding of cloned sheep through nuclear transfer from
differentiated foetal and adult cells. This is a major scientific breakthrough as it is the first time
that any mammal has been derived from foetal or adult cells." Id. A brief explanation of the
experiment follows:
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might treat cloned human offspring if Wilmut's technique became
available for human reproduction. Clearly, the cloning of whole humans,
particularly-as with Dolly-from an already mature being, raises a host
of issues. For me, however, the focus was on the procedure's prospective use as a means of assisted reproduction in humans.7

The blueprint of life is DNA. Its famous double helix is a long, long chain built
by linking together four simple molecules. The order in which those molecules are
linked determines the information contained in the DNA. All of the DNA in an
organism is referred to as the organism's geno[type].
Genes are DNA chains made up of hundreds or thousands of simple molecules.
Each gene contains instructions to make another type of crucial molecule, a
protein. The DNA in each of the body's cells contains all the genetic information
to produce a person. [A]n improper or missing link in the DNA chain... is a
mutation.
John Carey, DNA for Dummies: The Basics You Need to Know, Bus. WEEK, Mar. 10, 1997, at
84, 85 (emphases eliminated).
"Every cell in the body originates from a single fertilized egg, which contains in its DNA
all the information needed to construct a whole organism.... [E]ach cell, however specialized,
still carries in its nucleus a full complement of DNA... ." Michael Specter with Gina Kolata,
After Decades and Many Missteps, Cloning Success, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1997, at Al, A20.
"[W]hen embryonic cells become skin, or heart, or brain, all the genes not needed for these new
specialized functions are turned off." John Carey et al., The Biotech Century, Bus. WEEK, Mar.
10, 1997, at 78, 88.
Wilmut extracted cells from the mammary gland of an adult sheep, and then starved the
cells. Other cells might have worked too. See Richard Saltus, Cloning of Sheep Breaks New
Ground, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 3, 1997, at A9. Doing so changed the protein structure around
the cell's DNA. See Carey et al., supra, at 88. These proteins determine "which genes are active
or inactive.... The genes that had been turned off were primed to turn on again." Id. "The cell
from the donor ewe was treated in a way that rendered it dormant, so its nucleus wasn't
dividing.... mhe cytoplasm of the unfertilized egg somehow 'reprogrammed' the nucleus of
the six-year-old cell, turning back the clock.... ." Saltus, supra, at A9.
Wilmut scooped out the nucleus of the adult ewe mammary gland cell and put it next to the
treated mammary gland cells. See Carey et al., supra,at 88. "One pulse of electricity caused the
two cells to fuse, dumping the adult sheep's genes into the egg. Another pulse prodded the egg
to embark on the journey to make Dolly, the clone." Id. at 88-90.
University of Massachusetts scientists announced on January 21, 1998 the cloning of cattle
utilizing the same general "nuclear transfer" technique Wilmut used with Dolly. See Richard
Saleus, At UMass, Cloned Calves Lead to Big Expectations, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 21, 1998, at
Al, A13.
7. Unfortunately, the public's reaction to the news of the potential for human cloning has
been, for the most pait, uneducated. The general public does not make a distinction between the
human cloning already routinely happening with embryonic cells and whole-body cloning from
an adult cell such as in Dolly's case. See supra note 6. This has led to apocalyptic visions
represented by a host of science fiction films, such as The Boys from Brazil (cloning new
Hitlers), Jurassic Park (dangers of replicating dinosaurs), Multiplicity (comedy about a harried
man cloning himself), Sleeper (cloning a dictator from his nose), Bladerunner(based on Philip
Dick's book Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?, in which society uses synthetic replicants
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Cloning is a form of asexual reproduction which may be used by
either a male or female human being to reproduce (or replicate) his or
her genotype.' Since the clone is a sort of " 'delayed' genetic twin,"9
an initial conceptual problem arises of whether the clone should be

to do its dirty work); and books such as Aldous Huxley's Brave New World (embryo cloning
used as a method of social control) and Mary Shelley's Frankenstein(where the doctor never
named his creature, thus denying paternity). See George J. Annas, Cloning: Crossing Nature's
Boundaries, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 2, 1997, at Dl. Health law and bioethics professor George
J. Annas argues that "[t]here are much more efficient ways of creating killers or terrorists (or
even workers) than through cloning; physical and psychological conditioning can turn teen-agers
into terrorists in months, rather than waiting some 18 to 20 years for the clones to grow up and
be trained themselves. Cloning has no military or paramilitary uses. And even Hitler's genetic
twin would himself likely be quite a different person because he would grow up in a radically
altered world environment." Id. at D2.
The public also may be largely unaware of the strides being made in gene study and use.
Transgenic animal research is not often in the popular news, but, for example, Alexion
Pharmaceuticals Inc., in New Haven, and PPL Therapeutics, in Scotland, "already have altered
pig genes to make hearts, kidneys, and other organs that could be transplanted into humans ..... Carey et al., supra note 6, at 90. In July 1997, the same scientists who produced
Dolly announced they had "created a lamb that has a human gene in every cell of its body....
Animals with human genes could be used, in theory, to produce hormones or other biological
products to treat human diseases." Gina Kolata, Lab Yields Lamb With Human Gene, N.Y.
TIMES, July 25, 1997, at A18.
Gene manipulation is an everyday occurrence, and not merely a science fiction fantasy. "In
significant ways, cloning is not qualitatively different from prebirth genetic selection techniques
now in widespread use." John A. Robertson, Human Cloning: Should the UnitedStates Legislate
Against It? No: The Potentialfor Good Is Too Compelling, A.B.A. J., May 1997, at 81.
Germany has banned genetic manipulation of the human genome, which would have raised the
dreaded spectrum of species enhancement. B. Benoit, Reengineering the Species (human) (last
modified Mar. 28, 1996) <http:/cac.psu.edul-gsglO9/qstemO2OOl.html>. However, "it may soon
become necessary to alter the human genome, not for enhancement, but to repair ongoing
genetic damage ... caused by the excessive use of pesticides and chemical contamination of
water reserves." Id.
Finally, some members of the public may be misguided in thinking that human cloning
would give one a second chance at life. There is a group called the International Cloning
Society, headed by Dr. A.D. Lafferty, who advertises on the Internet with the slogan: "Have you
ever given thought to the possibility of living again? That's right! Living a new life, all over
again, right from the beginning, at some point in the future!" International Cloning Society
(visited June 10,1997) <http://www.wyattweb.comfreepagelaladlafferty@msn.comhome.shtml>.
They claim to lobby on behalf of "clonees," and to collect data and cell specimens. See id.
8. "Genotype" is all of the DNA in an organism, see Carey, supra note 6, at 84, as
compared to "genome," which is "the complete genetic makeup of a gamete or cell." NATIONAL
INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, I REPORT OF THE HUMAN EMBRYO RESEARCH PANEL D-5 (1994)
[hereinafter REPORT OF THE HUMAN EMBRYO RESEARCH PANEL].
9. NATIONAL BIOETICS ADVISORY COMMISSION, CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION i

(1997). For

a thorough discussion of the commission's report, see Cloning Symposium, 38 JURIMETRICS J.
1 (1997).
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considered a sibling rather than a child of the cloned individual. While
an argument can be made that the clone is of the same "generation" as
the person cloned, I think the age difference alone, at least when the
person cloned is old enough to make the choice to have a child this
way, suggests that the two should be considered as parent and child. For
purposes of this Article, I will consider that the person cloned and the
clone are of different generations.
If the person wishing to be cloned were male, he would require a
female partner or surrogate mother to carry the clone, at least until an
artificial womb"° is created which can carry the child from conception
to birth. A female wishing to clone herself might carry the child herself;
only if this were impossible, or undesirable, would she have to resort to
a surrogate mother or an artificial womb.
At first blush, when there is a consenting husband, the case of a
married woman who wishes to use cloning as a form of assisted
reproduction and who is willing to carry the child herself seems the least
problematic case for society. In a number of states, the birth mother of
a child is its legal mother. By analogy to artificial insemination, under
statutes such as the one in Massachusetts, 2 the husband of the surrogate would then be considered the legal father of the child, assuming he
consented. If such statutes were held inapplicable, there is still in many
states a presumption of paternity in the husband for any child born to
the wife during the marriage. 3 Unmarried women, single or with
partners, as well as married women without consenting husbands, raise
10. In a chapter entitled The Artificial Womb: An Escapefrom the 'Dark and Dangerous
Place', Gena Corea examines the not so fruitful history of attempts at building the artificial
womb. See GENA COR-A, THE MOTHER MACHINE 250-59 (1985). Until 1985, scientists had not
been able to keep fetuses alive in an artificial womb for more than 48 hours. See id. at 257.
However, scientists at Juntendo University in Tokyo, Japan, who have been working for years

on an artificial womb, announced in July 1997 that they have "successfully delivered a number
of goats from the artificial womb." See Bryan Christie & John Von Radowitz, Artificial Human
Womb 'in Ten Years', TiE SCOTSMAN, July 18, 1997, at 1. Each embryo was removed from its
mother's womb at 17 weeks of gestation and placed in the artificial womb until delivery. See
id. A goat's full term gestation is about 20 weeks, which corresponds roughly to about the
twentieth to twenty-fourth week in human gestation. Peter Hadfield, Japanese Pioneers Raise
Kid in Rubber Womb, NEW SciENST, Apr. 25, 1992, at 5. One of the goats so delivered has
been alive for six years. See Christie & Radowitz, supra, at 1. Professor Yoshinori Kuwabara
said that, with "time and money for experiments, maybe within ten years we will have made the

move from animal to humans." Id.; see generally Yoshinori Kuwabara, Experimental
Perinatology--Developmentof ExtrauterineFetalIncubationSystem, 44 NiPPON SANKA FuJINKA
GAKKAI ZASSHI 982 (1992) (presenting a case where a goat fetus was successfully incubated for
three weeks, followed by a trial birth from an artificial womb).
11. See infra note 93.
12. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 4B (West 1997).
13. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209C, § 6(a)(1) (West 1997).
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special problems addressed later in this Article. The case of a woman
not willing or able to carry the clone raises problems of surrogacy that
also will be addressed later.
If a married male wishes to clone himself, the least problematic case
is obviously the one where his wife consents and she is able to carry the
clone successfully. As above, the resulting child would be considered to
have the wife and her husband as his or her legal parents. Problems
involving unmarried males without a consenting spouse are addressed
below. As suggested earlier, a male wishing to have a child through
cloning must find a woman to gestate that clone, so one suspects that
issues of surrogacy will arise more often in male rather than female
cloning.
Of course, surrogacy is already a troubling area in the field of
assisted reproduction. A surrogate carrying a clone would be what we
now term a gestational rather than genetic surrogate;14 the analogy
would be to the woman carrying an embryo formed by in vitro
fertilization (IVF) from the gametes of the intended mother and father,
rather than to a woman whose own gamete had joined with that of the
intended father. While there is no conflicting genetic parental claim in
such cases, the woman carrying the clone would still be the birth
mother, giving her a potentially conflicting claim to parenthood on that
basis. Hopefully, by the time cloning becomes a reality, society will
have done more than at present to resolve the possible conflicts over
parenthood that gestational surrogacy raises.
As we explore the issues raised above, I hope to show that the
guiding principles of parental support and responsibility for the children
that I developed for traditional reproductive technologies should be used
for human whole-body cloning. 5 This assumes that, in time, such
cloning will become simply one more method of addressing human
infertility-one not sufficiently different from existing technologies to
warrant substantially different treatment by law and society. In light of
the quick reaction of many institutions, including the United States
government, to ban research on human whole-body cloning (and

14. For a discussion of the difference between gestational and genetic surrogacy, see supra

note 94.
15. By "whole-body cloning" I mean the creation of a whole human being using "a single
somatic cell via nuclear transfer cloning techniques." NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY
COMMISSION, supra note 9, at 2. A somatic cell is "any cell of an embryo, fetus, child, or adult
not destined to become a sperm or egg cell." Id. at app. 3. Nuclear transfer takes place when
"the nucleus from a diploid cell is fused with an egg from which the nucleus has been
removed." Id. A diploid is "a cell such as a somatic cell having two chromosome sets.. . ." Id.

at app. 1.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol49/iss2/3

6

Chester: To Be, Be, Be … Not Just to Be: Legal and Social Implications of
LEGAL AND SOCIAL IMPUICA7ONS OF CLONING

numerous suggestions that go so far as to ban the procedure altogether16), this issue requires the full discussion that I give it below.
Even assuming I can show that much of the public outcry against
cloning is unnecessary and the technique can be seen as simply another
tool against infertility, real practical problems remain in getting the
organs of the state to regulate such a procedure. To demonstrate this
difficulty, one only need turn to the current reluctance of government at
both the state and federal levels to adequately regulate even the most
accepted of existing assisted reproduction technologies.
II. ASSISTED CONCEPTION: SHOULD A LOOSE
REGULATIVE CULTURE CONTINUE?

A. Private Ordering or Government Regulation?
The United States has, on the whole, failed to regulate the various
reproductive technologies, 7 thus "medicalizing" rather than "legalizing" most procedures. Doctors engage with patients in a sort of private
16. In the United States, President Clinton proposed legislation in June 1997 that "would
ban cloning 'for the purposes of creating a child.' It would direct the National Bioethics
Advisory Commission to report in 4 1/2 years on whether the ban should continue." Clinton
Callsfor Human Cloning Ban, NEWSDAY, June 10, 1997, at A19. In addition, the President
proposed to ban the use of federal funds for cloning and "promised to work with other countries
that have banned cloning, such a Great Britain, Denmark, Germany, Australia, and Spain." Id.
A Republican-crafted ban on human cloning was defeated in the Senate on February 11, 1998,
when the necessary 60 votes to end a Democratic filibuster could not be mustered. See Chris
Black, Senate Vote Effectively Kills GOPBill to Ban Human Cloning, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 12,

1998, at A3.
The Report of the Human Embryo Research Panel by an ad hoc group of consultants to the
Advisory Committee to the Director of the National Institutes of Health, published in September
1994, set up guidelines with regard to federal funding of pre-implantation human embryo
research. See generally NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, I REPORT OF THE HUMAN EMBRYO
RESEARCH PANEL (1994). Among 10 categories of research the Report found unacceptable for
federal funding were cloning of human pre-implantation embryos, nuclear cloning, and transfer
of human embryos for extrauterine pregnancy. See id. at xix-xx.
On the other hand, opponents to a ban on human cloning argue that risks are taken every
day in medicine. See Gina Kolata, Commission on Cloning: Ready-Made Controversy, N.Y.

TIMES, June 9, 1997, at A12. A significant example, although involving matters of life or death,
is the experimentation with the baboon heart transplanted into Baby Fae in Loma Linda,
California, in 1984.
For a balanced view of the possibilities for regulation of human cloning, see Lori B.
Andrews, Assessing the Ethical andLegal Quandries,THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION,
Feb. 3, 1998, at B4.
17. Assisted reproductive techniques include IVF, embryo transfer, gamete and embryo
cryopreservation, and intracytoplasmic sperm injection. See Janet L. Dolgin, Suffer the Children:
Nostalgia, Contradictionand the New Reproductive Technologies, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 473, 475
n.5 (1996).
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ordering of the problems which stem from these technologies, using the
medium of contract. The director of the nation's largest infertility
clinic,"8 Dr. Joseph Schulman, argued at the Association of American
Law Schools (AALS) Conference on Property in June of 1997 that a
contract accompanied by clear notice of what the various procedures
entail resolves most difficulties-at least between the parties.
True believers in conservative economic theory 9 would no doubt
state that society's best interests are also served by such private
contractual ordering. As patients, doctors, and even surrogate mothers
maximize their own individual utility through the medium of contract,
the overall utility of society itself is thereby increased. However, some
of the rest of us might be a bit skeptical that society's needs generally
mirror those of individuals pursuing selfish goals.
The main contracting parties-the doctors, fertility centers, and
patients-are hardly in equal bargaining positions. For the most part,
patients are couples desperate to have children, and may feel they have
no realistic choice but to pay the high fees of fertility clinics and their
doctors. Surrogates may be the exploited or the exploiters depending on
the situation and fee. While many economists would still argue that the
patients maximize their utilities despite their unequal status, such a
vision is reached through a bloodless calculus, heedless of the real
emotional issues involved. Should society try to better regulate this
market to put the contracting parties on more equal footing?
In 1988 and 1989, two official bodies of the government, after
extensive study, "expressed the concern that the fertility industry, a
largely unregulated and rapidly growing business, is responsible for the
exploitation.., of infertile couples."' Although medical professional
groups have taken steps to regulate the industry, "governmental action
has been slow to follow. To a great extent, governmental regulation has
taken an ad hoc approach, addressing specific narrow problems as they
arise rather than focusing on the broader issues raised by the technologies and their logical consequences.' 21

18. The Genetics and IVF Institute, Fairfax, Virginia.
19. This theory is best exemplified by the "Chicago School" of Law and Economics, first
made prominent in the works of Ronald Coase, particularly in The Problem of Social Cost, 3
J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
20. Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, The "Orwellian Nightmare" Reconsidered: A Proposed
Regulatory Frameworkfor the Advanced Reproductive Technologies, 25 GA. L. REV. 625, 628
(1991) (citing Consumer Protection Issues Involving In Vitro Fertilization Clinics: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Regulation, Business Opportunities,and Energy of the House Comm.
on Small Business, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989), and CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY AssESsMENT, INFERTILITY: MEDICAL AND SOCIAL CHOICES (1988)).
21. Id. at 667.
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According to Professor Eggen, "[t]he emotional and political nature
of the abortion debate has clouded many of the true issues associated
with the advanced reproductive technologies."' Thus, "most state
legislation in this area reflect[s] the erroneous presumption that the
'
issues related to abortion are identical to those raised by IVF."
Likewise, "[t]he federal government, perhaps also influenced by the...
abortion debate, has left a net legacy of inaction and inattention." 4
Professor Eggen believes the private sector has addressed the
problems of the new reproductive technologies in a more systematic
manner than has the government' "Yet, gaps exist in the scope of
private regulations and enforcement power is lacking."26 This is why
I turn largely to government regulation to promulgate the proposals in
this Article.
While it is true that the "regulating bodies must be certain that the
interests advanced. .. are of a sufficiently compelling interest to
warrant impinging upon th[e right to procreate]," 27 I believe that the
societal interest in parental responsibilities toward the children of new
technologies, including cloning, is sufficiently important to meet this
test. Factors cited by Eggen that militate toward more and better
government regulation of reproductive technologies, including cloning,
are "the extent and urgency of problems associated with a particular
activity," its "experimental[, not] routine" nature, and the "extent and
effectiveness of existing governmental or professional regulation" with
respect to the activity involved." Cloning is now in its experimental
stage only with animals and is thus not regulated at the human level.
Since human cloning raises extensive and urgent problems, a measured
consideration of future governmental regulation of cloning as a clinical
procedure seems timely.
B. Other Issues in the Current Context
There are, of course, various costs to society caused by the widespread use of assisted reproduction. With the huge numbers of children
we already produce naturally who have no parents or real home, should
we not encourage, instead, more widespread adoption?29 Of course, as

22. Id. at 668 (citation omitted).
23. Id. at 687.

24. Id. (citation omitted).
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 688.
Id. at 710.
See generally Richard A. Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, 67 B.U.
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Judge Richard A. Posner points out, the real demand in America for
adoption is for healthy white babies, ° and couples wishing to adopt
these babies may have few opportunities to do so, or may have to pay
high fees in the black or "gray" market.31 By and large, relatively well
off couples are the ones who turn to fertility clinics. 2 Meanwhile, the

L. REV. 59 (1987) (advocating an adoption market and describing how it might operate and be
regulated, and with what potential consequences).
30. See Richard A. Posner, The Ethics andEconomics ofEnforcing ContractsofSurrogate
Motherhood, 5 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 21, 22 (1989). Discouraging what demand
there is among whites to adopt blacks, the National Association of Black Social Workers in 1972
labeled trans-racial adoptions as "cultural genocide." Telephone Interview with Howard Bradson,
National Association of Black Social Workers, Chicago (Sept. 16, 1997). This is still their
conviction. Id. One difficulty encountered by adopting individuals is the need of some foster
children to be kept with their other siblings or to be allowed regular visits by nonadoptive family
members. Legal loopholes also may allow biological mothers to effectively annul an adoption
years later.
31. See Posner, supra note 30, at 22.
32. This is presumed to be true because Medicare and Medicaid do not pay for assisted
reproduction procedures, as their scope does not include preventive and elective medicine. State
statutes vary widely with respect to private insurance mandates. The states with statutes on
infertility insurance are Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Montana, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, and Texas. See American Society for
Reproductive Medicine, State Infertility Insurance Laws (last modified May 30, 1997) (table)
<http://www.asrm.com/patientlinsur.html>. Only Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, and
Rhode Island mandate coverage of infertility treatments. See HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 431-10A116.5 & 432.1-604 (1997); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/356M & 125/5-3 (West 1997); MD. CODE
ANN., INSURANCE § 15-810 (1997); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175, § 47H, ch. 176A § 8K, ch.
176B § 4J & ch. 176G § 4 (1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 27-18-30, 27-19-23, 27-20-20 & 27-4133 (1996). California, Connecticut, and Texas mandate that infertility coverage be offered. See
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.55 (West 1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-536 (1996);
and TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 3.51-6 (West 1997). Infertility is either not defined, see, e.g.,
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 33-22-1521 & 33-31-102 (1996), or is restricted to married couples who
have tried to become pregnant and have experienced unexplained infertility for a defined period
of time, see, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-18-30(b) (1996) (defining infertility as "the condition
of an otherwise presumably healthy married individual who is unable to conceive or produce
conception during a period of one year."). The statutes may require that a patient's eggs be
fertilized with sperm from the patient's spouse. See, e.g., HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 431-IOA-1 16.5(3)
& 432.1-604(3) (1997). Some statutes provide for the establishment of minimum or maximum
coverage. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 23-85-137(c) & 23-86-118(c) (Michie 1997). Other
states completely exclude IVF from coverage. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
1374.55(a) (West 1997). The New York statute, for example, does not require coverage for the
reversal of voluntary sterilization, experimental procedures, or procedures intended solely to
produce pregnancy. See American Society for Reproductive Medicine, supra (citing N.Y. INS.
LAW §§ 3216, 3221 & 4304 (McKinney 1997)).
In the U.S. in 1993, the average cost of one IVF cycle was $6233. American Society for
Reproductive Medicine, FrequentlyAsked Questions About Infertility (last modified Aug. 13,
1997) <http://www.asrm.compatient/faqs.html#Q6:>. The cycle consists of a first stage when
the patient is given drugs to stimulate hormones to induce the production of eggs. Telephone
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numbers of minority children and children with disabilities available for
adoption continue to grow.
I have suggested in another article that the right of individuals to
procreate 33 -a protection of their autonomy and their liberty interests-should be balanced by financial responsibility for the children
created." Thus, I am uneasy about anonymous sperm or egg donation.
As a society, we need to begin stressing the connections between
people, financial and otherwise, even if this sometimes limits individual
choice.
In fact, our zeal for individual autonomy is beginning to take us
beyond the contract model in assisted reproduction. A recent article
notes that requests are on the increase from women who are partners of
accident victims who wish to be impregnated by sperm harvested from
the victims while they are in irreversible coma or immediately after their
death.35 When, as in the new cases reported, this is done without the
prior consent of the dead male, the harvesting is in no sense contractual,
nor is it sustainable under the law of gifts, because there is neither
donative intent nor delivery.36 I see no objection to allowing such
harvesting when the male has properly donated his sperm to a partner
Interview with Joyce Zeiz, American Society for Reproductive Medicine (Sept. 16, 1997). Then
the patient's eggs are retrieved and fertilized in a petri dish with the husband's or a donor's
sperm and subsequently implanted in the patient's womb. Id. The cycle may have to be repeated
several times before the patient actually gets pregnant and is able to carry the pregnancy to term.
Id.
33. The constitutional right to procreate was first recognized in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535 (1942). In Skinner, embezzlers were not subject to vasectomies pursuant to the state's
Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act, whereas those who committed larceny were. See id. The
Supreme Court recognized that the state thereby deprived a category of criminals of "a right
which is basic to the perpetuation of a race-the right to have offspring." Id.
34. See supra text accompanying notes 1-5.
35. See Susan M. Kerr et al., Post Mortem Sperm Retrieval, 157 J. OF UROLOGY 2154,
2155 (1997).
36. The University of Pennsylvania conducted a survey, published in June 1997, finding
that there were 82 requests for sperm between 1980 and 1995, with 43 requests in a single year
(1994-95). Richard Saltus, More Kin of Dead Seeking Their Sperm: Ethical Questions Raised
on Posthumous Retrieval Without Donor's Consent, BOSTON GLOBE, May 28, 1997, at A13.
"[M]ost of the women were wives or fiancees of the deceased. But some requests came from
family friends, and one each came from a social worker and an intensive care nurse." Id.
A recent case in Great Britain brought to the fore the problems connected with the issue of
posthumous sperm harvesting. See Glenda Cooper & David Garfinkel, Widow Wins FinalBattle
for Frozen Spenn, THE INDEPENDENT (LONDON), Feb. 28, 1997, at 2. In that case, a widow
fought for two years to be artificially inseminated with her dead husband's sperm. See id. In
February 1997, she finally was granted permission by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology
Authority "to be artificially inseminated in a Belgian clinic." Id. The authority originally fought
the case because of its concern with upholding "the integrity of the principle of consent [of the
dead husband]." Id.
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or contracted with her to produce their child if the male's consent is
coupled with financial responsibility on the part of the female and of the
dead male's estate.37 However, unconsented harvesting cuts off the
financial (and emotional) connection with the father. I submit this is
neither in society's nor the child's best interests. Pending decisive action
by the legal system, the decision whether to allow such harvesting is
being left to the doctors and hospitals. Predictably, this has resulted in
the procedure being allowed in some cases and not in others.3
III. WHOLE-BODY CLONING OF ADULT HUMANS: SHOULD

IT BE TREATED SIMILARLY TO OTHER
FORMS OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTION?

While those interested in a contractual ordering of assisted conception may be troubled, as I am, with unconsented sperm harvesting, the
possibility of whole-body cloning to produce a child upsets another
group entirely-a group we can characterize as holding deep moral or
religious beliefs about the origins and sanctity of life. While I would
join their disapproval if the cloning was unconsented, I am uncertain
why cloning, consented to by the affected individual, would be any
more morally dangerous than those means we already have.
It is an inescapable fact, however, that even the possibility of
consented whole-body cloning has raised the hackles of many.39 In this
37. As I have argued previously, the male's desire to sire children should be coupled with
financial responsibilities toward the child. See supra text accompanying notes 1-5.
38. See Saltus, supra note 36, at A13.
39. Assisted reproduction in general, even before Dolly's conception, has been hotly
discussed in many countries. In 1989, the Council of Europe released an information document
on Human Artificial Procreation, which revealed that few countries within Europe have reached
internal consensus on the issues surrounding assisted reproduction. Bartha M. Knoppers & Sonia
LeBris, Recent Advances in Medically Assisted Conception: Legal, Ethical and Social Issues,
17 AM. J.L. & MED. 329, 330 (1991) (citing Council of Europe Report). However, twelve points
of agreement regarding actual assisted reproduction practices have emerged:
(1) access to fertilization techniques should be limited to heterosexual married
couples or to those living in stable unions; (2) clinics and physicians offering these
techniques should be subject to medical supervision and regulation; (3) paternity
and maternity should be provided for by law for all birth technologies; (4) medical
records should be kept and medical records concerning participants should be
confidential; (5) embryonic life in vitro should be limited to fourteen days; (6)
storage of gametes or embryos should be subject to time limitations; (7)
post-mortem insemination or implantation should be prohibited; (8) commercial
surrogacy agencies or intermediaries should be prohibited; (9) the consent of the
participants should be obtained and standard conditions of donation should be
imposed; (10) reproductive technologies should be free from commercialization;
(11) neither sex selection of embryos, except for sex-linked diseases, nor eugenic
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Article, I will examine the basis of such disapproval to see whether it
forms a workable basis to prohibit, discourage, or even criminalize
cloning as a method of artificial reproduction. Since cloning will no
doubt ultimately be used, despite legislative or societal efforts to
discourage it, what exactly is it that some of us fear?
According to law and medical ethics professor R. Alta Charo, "the
maintenance of embryos in vitro and the prospect of cloning...
frequently lead to the charge of 'playing God'-they permit humans to
take over the function of actively intervening to transform a potential
baby into an actual baby.' '4° Presumably, Professor Charo is excluding
less active interventions such as traditional physician assisted artificial
insemination. Certainly, among actual and potential methods of assisted
conception, the embryos produced in vitro and the ones derived from
cloning have engendered the most political, religious, and moral
opposition.
If "playing God" is the objection to cloning, what precisely might
this mean and why is it so morally offensive? Those who believe human
life begins at conception often claim that fertilization is the moment at
which the "soul" enters the body.41 Thus, the argument goes, a clone
can have no soul because it is produced by asexual methods which
involve no such "magic moment." Since there is no point at which the
soul can enter, the clone might be cut off from God and Christ and
might not descend from Adam and Eve.42

selection should be allowed; and (12) extreme forms of genetic engineering (for
example, cloning, creation of chimeras, parthenogenesis, inter-species fertilization)
should be prohibited.

Id. at 330-33.
On the other hand, due to religious, cultural, social, and economic dissimilarities, the

following areas were characterized by fundamental differences among the countries:
(1) the question of the remuneration of donors; (2) the eventual access by the child
to information on the donor and the kind of information accessible (genetic or

nominative); (3) the keeping of registers (for example, what kind, how long or by
whom); (4) the donation and conservation of, and experimentation with, human
embryos (for example, by whom, for what, how long and when, if at all); (5)
limitations on the number of children by donor, and (6) the genetic diagnosis of

embryos.
Id. at 333.
40. R. Alta Charo, The Hunting of the Snark. The Moral Status of Embryos, Right-to-

Lifers, and Third World Women, 6 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 11, 37 n.68 (1995) (citation
omitted).
41. See id. at 16 (citing RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION 41-46 (1993)).
42. Emily D. Chester, a graduate in religion from Stanford University, indicates that the
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But can the individual soul enter the potential human at fertilization?
Reproductive biology... reveals that a single fertilized egg
can twin (thus creating two babies from one "unique"
embryo); in addition, and perhaps even more conceptually
complicating, two different embryos can merge to form a
single baby whose body is a mosaic of the two different
43
genetic patterns embedded in the two original embryos.
These changes may occur in the first few days after fertilization."' It
is thus difficult to see how a unique human soul can originate at
fertilization since "genetic completeness and uniqueness [of the fertilized
egg] do not entirely correspond to [ultimate] human individuality."45
Perhaps the soul attaches (or life begins) several days or even weeks
after fertilization, when all the above is sorted out and we have the
developing child's genetic pattern finalized.46 For purposes of embryo
issue of human cloning is quite problematic for theologians. Interview with Emily D. Chester,
New England Manager, Wired, in Boston, Mass. (Sept. 12, 1997). The various ethical arguments
are dependent on the procedures surrounding the cloning. Id.The debate is broad with numerous
questions concerning the spiritual source of the clone. Id. When does the soul actually enter the
body? Id. Does the human and its clone share one soul, or do they have two separate souls? Id.
If we assume that normally created humans are directly connected to God, are clones directly
connected as well? Id. Does the clone have any link to human ancestors, including Adam and
Eve, or is it one step removed from them? Id.
Some spiritual thinkers connect the soul with what they believe to be the physical
manifestation of the individual's essence. Id. In other words, they connect it with a persons's
electromagnetic field. Id. Is the clone's electromagnetic field the same as that of the person
cloned or is it merely a resonance from that field? Id. There are no answers at this time. Id.
43. Charo, supra note 40, at 16.
44. See Jed Rubenfeld, On the Legal Status of the Proposition that "Life Begins at
Conception," 43 STAN. L. REV.599, 617 (1991) (stating that twinning or "merging' can happen
in the first two weeks after fertilization).
45. Charo, supra note 40, at 16.
46. "The Roman Catholic Church did not view human life as beginning at the moment
of conception until 1869." Elizabeth Spahn & Barbara Andrade, Mis-Conceptions: The Moment
of Conception in Religion, Science, and Law, 32 U.S.F. L. REV. (forthcoming 1998) (manuscript
at 5, on file with the authors). In 1869 Pope Pius IX with the Apostolicae Sedis adopted the
view of immediate animation (the human soul entering immediately upon conception). See id.
Before 1869 the Church believed in ensoulment (at the third or fourth month of gestation). See
id. "Most early Christian theologians believed that the immortal soul could only be infused into
a highly developed and organized body." Id. at 13 (citing Tauer, The Tradition of Probabilism
and the Moral Status of the Human Embryo, in ABORTION AND CATHOLICISM: THE AMERICAN
DEBATE 57 (Jung & Shannon eds., 1988)). From Aristotelian ideas, the early Christians
borrowed the idea that an embryo generated from an original state of chaos through a continuous
process of organization. Spahn & Andrade, supra,at 13. The human soul-being indivisible and
rational-cannot enter an embryo while any twinning or "merging" is still occurring because it
needs enough organ development to have some minimal rational activity. Id. From 1140 to 1917,
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research, the National Institutes of Health published a report by the
Human Embryo Research Panel which drew the line at fourteen days
from fertilization, the usual time at which the "primitive streak"
appears.47 Pre-implantation and post-implantation embryos can be used
for experimentation until that age. 8 However, the choice of that age
admittedly may be just a political one4 9 on the part of the panel and not
a true judgment on "when life begins." Still, for those seeking a number
at which protection of the embryo should begin, that choice may be
more scientifically plausible than fertilization. 0 However, according to

delayed animation (where the soul enters the fetus's body relatively late in the pregnancy)
became the mainstream position of the Church. Id. at 15. In 1588 the Church changed its
position for three years under Pope Sixtus V, when abortion was considered a crime at any time
during the pregnancy. Id. In 1591 Pope Gregory XIV returned to delayed animation until 1869.
Id. at 16. Today, the position of the Church is instant animation. See id. (citing JANE HURST,
THE HISTORY OF ABORTION INTHE CATHOLIC CHURCH 19 (1989)).
47. See REPORT OF THE HUMAN EMBRYO RESEARCH PANEL, supra note 8, at 50-51. The
panel observed that:
There is no neural tissue whatsoever before the appearance of the primitive
streak; hence, there is no possibility of any kind of sentience. Soon after the
primitive streak appears, the process of neurulation, or the development of the
nervous system[,] begins.... [N]eurulation ... includes the development of the
brain and the specific structures that underlie sentience and the ability to
experience pleasure and pain.
The Panel agreed that, for public policy purposes, a clear time limit should be
set. While the Panel finally agreed on the appearance of the primitive streak as the
primary biological marker for a limit to research, it recognizes that the choice of
this stage represents a compromise among competing viewpoints.
Id. at 47-48.
48. See id. at 48, 50-51. "The Panel understood that if an embryo is morally equivalent
to a child, it cannot be subjected to harmful experimentation." Charo, supra note 40, at 15. See
generally id. at 12, 14, 16, 18. It should be noted that the Panel was willing to contemplate
future federal funding for research up to the eighteenth day of development. Id. at 18.
49. See REPORT OF THE HUMAN EMBRYO RESEARCH PANEL, supra note 8, at 48; Charo,
supra note 40, at 19-20.
50. See Charo, supra note 40, at 16 (arguing that genetic completeness achieved at
fertilization does not necessarily correspond to human individuality). Nonetheless, many believe
fertilization is the place to fix life's beginning because the being has the potential for life.
"Viability" as a marker for personhood is an anomaly, however, because it is "a measure of our
technology, not the fetus's biology." Rubenfeld, supra note 44, at 620. In that view, "the embryo
is a person for its first three days [when embryos can be conceived in vitro as well as in utero,
making the fetus allegedly viable at conception], then loses its personhood [because it cannot
survive outside the maternal womb at the present level of technology], and then regains it
twenty-three weeks later [when there is the possibility that the very premature baby can be put
in a life sustaining incubator until it can survive on its own]." Id. at 621. Right-to-lifers argue
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Charo, "the same potential [to be born] exists long before fertilization,
in any sperm or egg. What is it about fertilization that [arguably]
changes the status of the entity? It must be more than mere genetic
completeness and uniqueness."51
The reality that pre-fertilization gametes, like post-fertilization
entities, have the potential to produce babies undermines the "potentiality for life" focus that the Supreme Court slipped into Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services' in 1989. So the potentiality for life
outside the womb cannot really be the test of when protectable life
begins.
This understanding has relevance to the question of cloning. Once
whole-body cloning by nuclear transplantation (the procedure used to
produce Dolly) is perfected in humans, "any skin cell could now

that life starts at fertilization, or the moment of "genetic completeness." However, "[e]very cell
in our bodies is genetically complete; every nucleus in every cell spells out the same information
about the 'entire constitution of the person'. Quite plainly, carrying all the necessary genetic
information about an individual human being cannot be equivalent to being a human being." Id.
at 625 (emphasis in the original).
51. Charo, supra note 40, at 16.
52. 492 U.S. 490 (1989). That case involved a Missouri statute which requires physicians
to perform certain tests to determine the viability of a fetus before performing an abortion on
a woman the physician reasonably believes to be 20 or more weeks pregnant. See id. at 492. The
Supreme Court's plurality in Webster decided that the Roe v. Wade trimester framework, see
infra note 61, should be abandoned because the Supreme Court could
not see why the State's interest in protecting potential human life should come into
existence only at the point of viability, and that there should therefore be a rigid
line allowing state regulation after viability but prohibiting it before viability....
"mhe State's interest, if compelling after viability, is equally compelling before
viability."
Id. (quoting Thomburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
795 (1986) (White, J., dissenting)). Webster quotes Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion in
Thornburgh, declaring that the "[s]tate has compelling interests in ensuring maternal health and
in protecting potential human life, and these interests exist 'throughout pregnancy.' "Id. (quoting
Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 828 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
Despite the Supreme Court's statements in Webster that Missouri's statute was
merely a statement of values, not intended to be legally enforceable, Missouri has
now five cases interpreting their statute.... Missouri's position is clear: not only
is the moment of conception preamble enforceable as law itself, but according the
Missouri courts, all of Missouri law (statutory, case law and administrative
regulations) must be interpreted in accordance with the moment of conception
statute.
Spahn, supra note 46, at 92.
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develop into a baby if it were placed into a denucleated egg cell."53
The "potentiality for life" test would then require that "every skin cell
has a right to life due to its potential for development into a baby, albeit
with some artificial assistance[.] But even those most committed to the
argument from potentiality will say that it is ridiculous to think every
cell in our body should be protected."'
Charo concludes:
Since the embryo's status cannot be determined with
precision due to fundamental, irresolvable value confficts,
[the Human Embryo Research Panel] should have focused
entirely on the already born members of the population and
asked whether ethical principles of justice require that one
or another of their interests be given preference.55
Since we cannot determine biologically an absolute point at which life
begins, we ought to focus on the interests of scientists, doctors, and
infertile couples in determining, in any particular situation, the point at
which developing life should be protected.
It is clear that in its early stages, human full-body cloning will
involve the destruction of embryos in order to produce the one which
develops.56 This is a major argument against cloning. However, one
should consider that in the first weeks of development at least sixty per
cent of naturally fertilized embryos fall to attach to the uterine lining

53. Charo, supra note 40, at 17. This is what Wilmut did with Dolly. For a discussion of
Wilmut's technique, see supra note 6.
54. See id. "State tax deductions for dependent children currently apply to a child born
alive. Creating legal rights following conception would potentially permit parents to claim
miscarried fetuses, fetuses still in utero and perhaps even late menstrual periods as dependent
children." Spahn & Andrade, supra note 46, at 88.
55. Charo, supra note 40, at 19 (emphasis added).
56. Dolly represents one live and healthy birth out of 277 eggs which were fused with
adult cells. Specter, supra note 6, at A21. One must be careful in defining "embryo," as that
term may evoke differing notions in the public's minds and consciences. For instance, the
Catholic Church called the destruction of non-claimed embryos in the United Kingdom after five
years of storage a prenatal massacre. See Spahn & Andrade, supra note 46, at 41-42. What they
were referring to were actually blastomeres (made up of 4 cells each), or pre-implantation
embryos. See id.
It is worthwhile noting that multiple gestation (with its risks to both fetuses and mothers)
is common in IVF procedures. See American Society for Reproductive Medicine, Fact Sheet:
Multiple Gestation and Multifetal Pregnancy Reduction (last modified Oct. 14, 1996)
<http://www.asrm.comfact/multiple.html>. The risks associated with multiple gestation include
"increased chance of miscarriage, birth defects, [and] premature birth.... Multifetal pregnancy
reduction is usually performed between nine and 12 weeks gestation, but it has been performed
as late as 24 weeks gestation." Id.
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and develop.57 Despite this fact, many have decried cloning's potential
for killing embryos just as they did in the case of IVF, which itself
results in the production of numerous pre-implantation embryos, many
of which are ultimately destroyed.
One commentator raises the question of how the destruction of such
potential life can be a wrong "if that being at the time it is 'wronged'
has no ability to perceive itself as wronged."58 Even if the unwitting
embryo cannot itself be wronged, the question arises whether those
already born, or even God himself, might have an interest in the
development of that potential to fruition and thus be wronged by its
destruction.59
These are puzzling dilemmas. It is interesting to note, however, that
both the cloned individual and the embryo in vitro produced from two
gametes would have more protection from the law than an embryo,
however produced, once it is placed in a woman's body.' This result
is because the woman's liberty interest conflicts with whatever interest
members of society (or God) may have in protecting that embryo. The
woman is free to abort the embryo, consonant with the standards
announced in Roe v. Wade.61
If it is the constitutional right of the woman not to procreate which
trumps the right to life of the embryo at its early stage, would not the

57. See Charo, supra note 40, at 16; see also DEBORAH LYNN STEINBERG, BODIES IN
GLASS-GENETICS, EUGENICS, EMBRYO ETHICS 38-39 (1997) ("Despite claims by some IVF
clinics of success rates upwards of 20 per cent, Gena Corea and Susan Ince found, in a survey
they conducted in the United States, that success rates for IVF treatment are routinely
manipulated by clinicians in various ways.... [N]o rates of live birth [were found] higher than
10 per cent, and even those occurred only at the best clinics."). Christine Gosden, professor of
medical genetics at Liverpool University and member of the Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Authority in the United Kingdom, states that "7.5 per cent of infants in the UK
suffered congenital defects, and 1.5 per cent were serious. Fifteen per cent of all pregnancies
ended in miscarriage." Christie, supra note 10, at 1.
58. See Charo, supra note 40, at 16 n.61 (citing Michael Tooley, In Defense of Abortion
and Infanticide, in WHAT IS A PERSON? 83-114 (Michael F. Goodman ed., 1988)).
59. See Rubenfeld, supra note 44, at 611-12 (suggesting, for example, the interests of
potential mothers and potential heirs and holders of future interests).
60. See Charo, supra note 40, at 17 n.66.
61. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The trimester framework of Roe is as follows: Prior the end of
the first trimester, the pregnant woman may chose to have an abortion as per the judgment of
her physician because the state's interest in the potential life is not yet compelling at this point.
See id. at 163. During the second trimester, "a State may regulate the abortion procedure to the
extent that the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation and protection of maternal
health." Id. During the third trimester, "[i]f the State is interested in protecting fetal life after
viability, it may go so far as to proscribe abortion during that period, except when it is necessary
to preserve the life or health of the mother." Id. at 163-64. "This is so because the fetus then
presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb." Idc at 163.
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perfection of an artificial womb allow us to provide more legal
protection for a developing embryo-whether produced by cloning or
other methods of assisted conception-than is now the case? In other
words, shouldn't those interested in protecting potential life forms at the
fertilization stage be happy if an artificial womb is perfected because it
will obviate the need to protect a woman's liberty interest, which may
conflict with the developing child's right to life? Despite the apparent
rationality of this position, one suspects that many in the right-to-life
movement would not react this way and would view an artificial womb
as yet another attempt by man to "play God."
According to Professor Jed Rubenfeld, "the facts by themselves are
not dispositive [as to when life begins]; it is a question of attaching
significance to these facts."'62 He notes, however, that "[t]he tendency
to reify personhood-to imagine it as a thing that comes into existence
in concrete, factual fashion-may be difficult to overcome." 3 However,
we must begin to "conceptualize personhood in exactly the same fashion
as we conceptualize adulthood: as a conclusory term designating a point
at which we choose to attach to a developing human a certain legal or
moral status."'" For example, "when determining whether a fetus is a
person in the context of inheritance or tort law, states' analysis need not,
and should not, be the same as for the same determination in the context
of abortion."65
Rubenfeld observes that, "[i]f the state were permitted to rely on the
claim that God infuses a human soul into every fertilized egg, our
analysis would change dramatically."' Thus, "[ain 'ensoulment' claim
62. Rubenfeld, supra note 44, at 618. The beginning of life is best described as a
continuum, from coitus, to zygote (the fertilized egg), to morula (about eight cells travel down
the fallopian tube to the uterus and when they get there they constitute about 16-32 cells), to
blastocyst (when after about four days of floating in the intrauterine fluid the organism is able
to implant, which occurs about seven days after ovulation), to embryo, and finally to fetus. See
Spahn, supra note 46, at 41-42. Certainly, however, the 4-8 cell frozen pre-implantation
embryos, such as those at issue in the well known Tennessee case, Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d
588, 589 (Tenn. 1992) (where divorced wife wanted to implant a frozen embryo produced by
her and her husband over the husband's objection), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1259 (1993), are far

from the viability recognized for personhood in Roe and Webster See id. at 595.
63. Rubenfeld, supra note 44, at 618.
64. Id. at 619.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 625. Rubenfeld notes that fertilization does not necessarily equal conception. See
id. at 625 n.112. However, he does equate fertilization with conception as so shall I. The
American Medical Association (AMA) considers conception to be synonymous with
implantation. See OBSTETRIC-GYNECOLOGIC TERMINOLOGY 299,327 (E. Hughes ed., 1972). The
corollary to this is that the process of conception arguably begins with fertilization. Other
definitions also distinguish fertilization from conception, calling fertilization the egg and sperm's
fusion and conception the implantation of the fertilized egg into the walls of the uterus, which
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would present a powerful, indeed essentially unanswerable, basis for
states to choose conception[67] as the moment of personhood. But
religious tenets cannot be relied upon in this context ... ."' Indeed, "if
the question were solely a matter of religion, then the [constitutional
clause prohibiting an established religion] would preclude states from
enacting any particular answer into law."69
To many with moral objections to cloning, IVF with its risk of
destruction to embryos and pre-embryos also is objectionable. Yet, it is
clear from the recent public outcry that cloning is objectionable to a
wide range of people, and the opposition is even more intense than it
was to IVF.70 Why might this be true?
First, the fertilization of the egg in vitro, although clearly artificial,
can be said to mimic to some extent natural reproduction. After all, a
sperm cell, with one set of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), fertilizes an
egg with a different set.7 In cloning, by Wilmut's method, one
person's DNA is scooped out of one cell's nucleus and is made to bond
by electrical stimulation with an enucleated egg cell of another.72 When
both the DNA from the donor cell and an enucleated egg cell are joined,
the resulting entity carries the DNA of the donor nucleus and a small
fraction of a different type of DNA from the egg cell's cytoplasmic
mitochondria.73 The latter does not, however, contain genetic instructions for the development of the resulting embryo.74 If this inactive
mitochondrial DNA is not considered, each clone carries only the
nuclear DNA of its donor, whereas an IVF embryo carries the DNA of
both "parents."75 Whether this relatively small difference in the
generally occurs about a week after male ejaculation. See Spahn & Andrade, supra note 46, at
39-43. However, "current medical research does not pinpoint any particular moment at which
scientists agree human life begins." Id. at 21.
67. Many state statutes leave the term "conception" undefined. See supra text accompanying note 66.
68. Rubenfeld, supra note 44, at 625.

69. Id. at 614.
70. See NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMIrrEE, supra note 9, at ii (documenting
the initial negative reactions to Wilmut's announcement).
71. For a description of the process employed by Wilmut to create Dolly, see supra note

6.
72. See id.
73. See id.; see also NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 9, at 90.
Mitochondria are "small, spherical to rod-shaped components (organelles) of the cytoplasm; they
are the principal sites of the generation of energy resulting from the oxidation of foodstuffs."
REPORT OF THE HUMAN EMBRYO RESEARCH PANEL, supra note 8, at D-6. Cytoplasm is "the
contents of a cell other than the nucleus. Cytoplasm consists of a fluid containing numerous
structures, known as organelles, that carry out essential cell functions." Id. at D-4.
74. See NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 9, at 90.
75. See B. Benoit, Genetic Cloning vs. Genetic Twinning (last modified Aug. 7, 1997)
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production of the clone from the production of other children (whether
artificial or natural) is sufficient to justify different treatment by society
is at best debatable.
Many instances of cloning have a similarity to unconsented sperm
harvesting in that the will to reproduce of only one person is involved.76 Even anonymous sperm donation used for artificial insemination involves the will of that donor as well as the will of the recipient
to procreate. Yet, the major objections to cloning appear to come less
from the fact that only one person wills the procreation than from the
reality that only one person's genome is reproduced and that such
reproduction need not involve a sperm cell and a nucleated egg cell at
all.
IV.

CLONING AND THE FAMILY

Assuming cloning technology becomes available as a form of
assisted reproduction, how should society and the legal system handle
those factors that make it different from other forms of assisted
conception? Obviously, one person-male or female-can have himself
or herself cloned without the participation or consent of another, except
as a surrogate. This reality would strike at the very heart of what we
<http:llwww.ncgr.orglgpi/odyssey/dolly-cloningtcloning-twinning.html>. In twinning, a type of
sexual reproduction, the fertilized egg's genome comes from both parents or donors. See id.
When the fertilized egg divides itself into separate eggs, each will have an identical genome. See
id. The children resulting from this process will be genetically identical siblings, thus sharing
the same nuclear and mitochondrial DNA. See id. Cloning, however, is made possible by nuclear
transfer technology, a form of asexual reproduction. See id. The resulting clone will have the
genome of only one parent or donor and will have in common with him or her the same nuclear
DNA but not common mitochondrial DNA. See id.
The critics of Wilmut's experiment which resulted in Dolly have tried to attack the veracity
of his scientific research by declaring that Wilmut failed to ensure the validity of his claims. See
Gina Kolata, Some Scientists Ask. How Do We Know Dolly Is a Clone?, N.Y. TIMES, July 29,
1997, at C3. In particular, Dr. Norton Zinder, professor of molecular genetics at Rockefeller
University, argues that Wilmut should have tested Dolly's mitochondria. See id. The possible
results could have been that
Dolly has mitochondria only from the egg, or her mitochondria are identical to
those of the udder cell or her mitochondria are a mixture, with some from the egg
and some from the udder cell. [If the results indicated that her mitochondria] were
identical to those of the egg or if it showed that they were a mixture, that would
prove that she had been produced through cloning.
Id. If the mitochondria were identical to that in the donor's udder cell, then Dolly might or
might not be a clone. See id.
76. For purposes of this analogy, we are assuming surrogates are merely neutral gestators
with no intent to produce a particular child.
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consider "family," whether the traditional one, or one involving, for
example, a lesbian couple. The very idea of partnership in raising a
child could be avoided.
As I have indicated elsewhere, I am uneasy with reproduction
techniques that cut the resulting child off from the emotional or
financial connection of a potential second "parent."' Thus, when
cloning becomes available, I would like to see it regulated by the
government. Given the recent proclivity of the Supreme Court to leave
such matters to the states, 78 one can assume that for the foreseeable
future such regulation would be left to the state legislatures, and by
default to state courts.
If the states ban whole-body human cloning or criminalize it as a
form of reproduction, their legislatures will lose their opportunity to
regulate it. The technology will likely move "off shore" or undercover.79 I hope that does not happen. Although the current outcry may
succeed in slowing research, cloning itself should not be banned or
criminalized.
Who, after all, will seek the use of this technology? Presumably, one
group would include individuals whose partners do not want to be
involved in reproduction and for whom copying their own genome is
preferable, for marital or psychological reasons, to becoming biologically involved with the genomes of others. In other cases, a couple or a
member of a couple may want to produce children, but be physiologically unable to do so even with the aid of traditional assisted reproduction techniques. By use of cloning, they could produce a child who at
least carried the genotype of one of them. Also, a case might be
imagined where both adults carry a lethal recessive gene and want to
avoid, via cloning, the one in four chance present in natural reproduction
of producing a fatally diseased child.8" In still others, a person without
77. See generally Chester, supra note 1.
78. The Supreme Court largely has left the abortion issue (and related right-to-die issues)
in the hands of the states. See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 113, Webster, 492 U.S. at 490. See
generally Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
79. As in the case of IVF, "procreative tourism" presumably would be undertaken by
citizens of the global village "in order to exercise their personal reproductive choices in other
less restrictive states." See Knoppers & LeBris, supra note 39, at 333.
80. See NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 9, at 79. One of the
suggested uses for cloning is to make copies of an embryo to avoid giving the woman drugs to
pump out eggs-a taxing demand on a woman's body-thus lowering the cost of the procedure
while somewhat protecting the woman's health. See Gina Kolata, For Some Infertility Experts,
Human Cloning Is a Dream, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1997, at A8. Variations on this technique are
already possible, if the cloning is not done from adult cells. Telephone Interview with Dr.
Andrea Vidali, Assistant Professor in Obstetrics and Gynecology, Columbia University (July
1997). Another suggested exploitation of the cloning technique, although repugnant to many,
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a partner might want to use cloning, rather than using donor egg or
sperm, to avoid the health risks and genetic uncertainties involved with
the use of such gametes."'
As noted in the introduction, married men and women who wish to
be cloned, where both spouses consent to the cloning, would appear to
present little problem for the regulator if the wife is willing and able to
gestate the clone. Current law should be able to adapt rather easily to
accepting the husband and wife as the legal mother and father. If,
however, the wife does not gestate the clone, we encounter the
surrogacy problems previously mentioned.
If the non-cloning spouse will not consent to the procedure, that
spouse should not be considered a parent. In that case, the spouse
wishing to clone should be required to undergo counseling before the
state allows the procedure. Certainly, major problems for the marriage
might be anticipated and thus the non-consenting spouse should be
encouraged to participate in the counseling. If the cloning spouse
persists and the non-cloning spouse continues to refuse consent, the
cloning parent, if allowed to undergo the procedure at all, should be
would be cloning to create a source of eggs for a woman whose ovaries had failed. See Kolata,
supra, at A8. A female fetus would be allowed to develop, then it would be aborted and its
ovaries removed. "[The doctor] would harvest eggs from the fetal ovaries, which would, of
course, be genetically identical to the woman's eggs, if she had been able to make them. Then
he would fertilize the fetal eggs in the laboratory, allowing the woman to have her own genetic
children." Id. This essentially would be a questionable use of spare parts.
81. For example, in a case that received publicity because the victim was a public figure,
Judith Billings chose IVF because her second husband had had a vasectomy; however, her donor
sperm was infected with HIV and transmitted it to her. Janet Midwinter, The Test-Tube Baby
that Gave Me AIDS; Judith Billings Longedfor a Child, but Her Sperm Donor Carrieda Fatal
Disease, MAIL ON SUNDAY (London), Mar. 10, 1996, at 39, 42. In the United States, only 20
of the 50 states make HIV screening tests for donor sperm mandatory. See id. "Experts admit
they have no idea how many women may develop AIDS as a result of being impregnated by
affected sperm. In Britain alone it is estimated that between 10,000 and 20,000 women received
artificial insemination in the Eighties before screening procedures were tightened up. And,
disturbingly, no one knows how many of these women-like Judith-used anonymous donor
sperm." Id. HIV incubation time is very long-I0-15 years-which makes it difficult to diagnose
how many women treated for infertility in the Eighties, before stricter tests were introduced,
actually carry the virus but do not yet have the symptoms. See id.
Donors were tested for disease only once when they gave sperm, possibly missing
any signs of the incubating HIV. Today they are tested again six months later, and
before the sperm is used, in case their infection was latent, as can happen with
HIV. On August 1, 1991, Government legislation set up the Human Fertility and
Embryology Authority to licence clinics and issue a code of practice on double
screening of donors.
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required to undergo further counseling regarding the financial burden he
or she will have to bear alone.
In the case of the unmarried couple, adoption by the non-cloning
partner should be encouraged by the state and required if the noncloning partner wishes to have any parental rights. 2 The cloning

82. If consent by the non-cloning spouse were not sufficient to make that spouse a legal
parent of the clone, adoption might be required. Since the clone could be analogized to a child
of the cloning parent alone, thus making the non-cloning parent like a step-parent, the following
observation may be pertinent: "Adoption presently requires fairly elaborate intervention by the
state, largely through the judiciary, to determine the fitness for parentage of the potential
adopter(s). Some disposition or relaxation from these rules usually is permitted in cases involving ... step-parents who have the consent of a natural parent." Walter J. Wadlington, Baby M:
Catalystfor Family Law Reform?, 5 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 1, 14 n.63 (1989).
Adoptions are governed by state law, usually a version of the Uniform Adoption Act of
1994 (U.A.A.). See LESLIE J. HARRIS ET AL., FAMILY LAW 1165, 1165-74 (1996). Generally,
adoption is viewed as a two-step process. See id. at 1165. First, there is the termination of the
relationship between the child and the parent about to be replaced; second, there is the creation
of the relationship between the new (adoptive) parent and the child, which generally requires a
judicial proceeding. See id. Voluntary consent of a biological parent and in many cases of both
biological parents is required unless proof of desertion and/or neglect are present. See id. at
1173-74. Some statutes require that a parent may not give official consent to adopt before a
child is born and others until three to five days after birth (although the U.A.A. states that the
adoption can be revoked up to 192 hours (8 days) after consent is given. See id. at 1173.
"The language in most adoption statutes compels a majority of courts to deny adoption
petitions filed by same sex couples because the adoption statute would divest the natural mother
of her parental rights should the court confer these rights on her lesbian partner. The statutes
only allow for one parent of each sex to be a legally recognized parent, and thus do not permit
two partners of the same sex to share parental rights and responsibilities." John E. Durkin,
Comment, Reproductive Technology and the New Family: Recognizing the Other Mother, 10 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 327, 333 (1993) (citation omitted). This situation should be
changed. The demand by lesbian couples for the new reproductive technologies is quite high.
For example, a director of a sperm bank in California stated that approximately 40% of his
clients were lesbian couples who intend to raise their children in a lesbian co-parent family. See
E. Donald Shapiro & Lisa Schultz, Single-Sex Families: The Impact of Birth Innovations Upon
TraditionalFamily Notions, 24 J. FAM. L. 271, 278 (1985-86).
The reality of lesbian couples going through assisted reproduction in order to have children,
via cloning or otherwise, becomes more sobering when one actually stops discussing the subject
in abstract terms and attaches names and faces to the people in these new families. In a case
famous in Massachusetts, Dr. Susan Love and her domestic partner Dr. Helen Cooksey, won
joint adoption in 1993 of Katie, born to Dr. Love with the sperm of a cousin of Dr. Cooksey.
See Laura A. Kiernan, Lesbian Couple Thrilled OverAdopted Ruling, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 12,
1993, at 29. "The father, who has no role in the child's day-to-day upbringing and provides no
financial support, treats the child as a niece." Id. In another recent case, the Supreme Court of
Virginia recognized "that a lesbian mother is not per se an unfit parent." Bottoms v. Bottoms,
457 S.E.2d 102, 108 (Va. 1995) (citation omitted). However, the court also recognized that
"[clonduct inherent in lesbianism is punishable as a class 6 felony [in Virginia]; thus, that
conduct is another important consideration in determining custody." Id. The court further stated
that the burden placed on a child living in a home where lesbianism is actively practiced,
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partner should then be required to undergo counseling on both the
emotional and financial aspects of his or her decision before being
allowed to undergo the procedure.
In any case where an individual wants to clone without spousal
consent (marriage) or adoption (by the partner), the state might even
want to consider banning the procedure altogether. First of all, this
scenario raises the issues of the lack of emotional and material support
from a second parent. Second, it involves significant loss of control by
society over what may be an individual's temporary whim about the
joys of child-rearing. Third, if individuals can clone themselves without
the involvement of a partner, we do not even mimic in a general way
the methods of child rearing that have been present throughout human
history. Given the American emphasis on individual rights, including
that of procreation, banning such procreation might prove politically and
legally impossible; if so, mandated counseling on the financial and
emotional risks of single parenting in this situation would seem a
necessity.
In addition to procreative liberty itself, there may be other reasons
to allow single people, with or without partners, to clone. The National
Bioethics Advisory Commission raised, for example, the empathetic case
of a sterile person whose family had been wiped out in the Holocaust
and who was the last of her genetic line.83 Also raised was a scenario
in which a person with leukemia might wish to clone herself to produce
a child whose bone marrow could be used as a replacement but would
otherwise be raised normally.84 Perhaps cloning for such purposes
especially the "social condemnation" resulting from such an arrangement, "will inevitably afflict
the child's relationships with its 'peers and with the community at large.' " See id. (citation
omitted). One cannot help wondering whether local morality will always encourage different
results in different parts of the country, and whether financial and social status determine the
outcomes in many cases. Had Drs. Love and Cooksey not been doctors and financially
comfortable, would the court have awarded the joint adoption? By the same token, might the
court in Virginia have awarded custody if the mother had not been on welfare and burdened by
a dubious past?
Even more evocative is the issue of the role of the "donor" in cases such as Dr. Love's and

Dr. Cooksey's. In an actual situation known to the author, two professional women in a long
term domestic partnership, K. and P., are friends with a married couple they know from church.
When the wife of the married couple was pregnant with their first child, K. and P. approached
the couple with a reasonable proposition. Having gone through a list of male relatives who did

not satisfy them, K. and P. asked the husband if he would donate the sperm to impregnate K.
At the time of this writing, K. is pregnant. The father has committed to supporting the child
emotionally but not financially. The married couple regarded the opportunity to help K. and P.
as a community effort. They are happy to know that their daughter will share her time, toys and

father with K.'s and P.'s child.
83. See NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 9, at 55.

84. See id. at 55 & 80.
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should, if allowed at all, be confined to limited retrieval of replaceable
tissues rather than retrieval of irreplaceable organs.
If it proved constitutionally and politically possible to ban cloning
for unattached people or people whose partners would not adopt or
consent, cloning where these factors were present might prove minimally acceptable to those who now oppose cloning at all costs, because it
still occurs in a "family" situation. In support of the banning of cloning
without the partner's consent or help, it is possible to argue, for
example, that no constitutional right to procreate would be involved
since the ban would be only on gene copying or replication.85 If this
argument were adopted by the courts, the state might be able to impose
this ban even in unique and compelling situations such as the two
mentioned above. Such a ban also might appear to be in the "best
interests" of the resulting child, unless we consider the children who
therefore will not be produced. John A. Robertson apparently agrees that
prohibiting a procedure that will not allow children to be born is by
definition not in the best interests of the children thus denied life."
To recapitulate, I think the wisest course would be for the states not
to ban cloning for reproductive purposes, but to retain jurisdiction over
it and closely regulate the procedure." On balance, I would argue that
the state might require written consent, or adoption if necessary, by a
spouse or adoption by a non-spousal partner to allow the procedure in
the first place. In the case of a single person or one whose partner does
not consent or adopt, the state might consider banning the procedure
altogether. In fact, if the banning of some uses of the procedure were
found to be constitutional, such a concession might have to be made
politically in order for the state to allow cloning at all.
What should society's posture be in the meantime, while the
procedure is being perfected? While one might hope the current
American bans on research involving the cloning of humans would be
lifted, this does not seem likely.8 Consequently, the research probably
will have to be carried on elsewhere, and probably not under optimal
conditions.89 Before the technology becomes available for use, howev-

85. According to some, whole-body cloning should be regarded as replication and not
reproduction. See id. at 95 (citing G. Annas, Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Public Health
and Safety, of the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee (Mar. 12, 1997)).
86. See id. at 65-66 (quoting John A. Robertson, Testimony before the National Bioethics
Advisory Commission (Mar. 13, 1997)).
87. An analogy can be made to alcohol prohibition in the United States (1920-1933),
which was widely ignored and contributed to a rise in organized crime.
88. See REPORT OF THE HUMAN EMBRYO RESEARCH PANEL, supra note 8, at xix (listing
the types of research found to be unacceptable for federal funding).
89. For example, physicist Richard Seed has announced he will begin cloning humans
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er, we might want to know a few things for certain. For example, will
the "old" DNA used from the cloned individual have defects that would
not be present in "young" DNA? If so, will the clone itself have a
shortened or abnormal life? Is cloning, even on a relatively limited
scale, bad for the human species? Are continually new combinations of
DNA necessary for the adaptations to environment required by natural
selection for a successful human race?' Sound, well-researched
answers to such questions, if they militate against cloning, may make
humans unwilling to use the technology at all, whatever the law may or
may not say.
V.

CLONING AND SURROGACY

Since bans on human research regarding cloning will hamper
society's acquisition of answers to questions such as those above, it is
likely that cloning for reproductive purposes will be tried despite
possible biological hazards for the resulting children. Unless an artificial
womb is perfected which can carry a child from conception to birth,9'
cloning also will raise related issues of surrogacy. With existing
reproductive technologies, surrogacy has already created a muddle. It is
useful here to examine those surrogacy issues that can be expected to
evolve with the advent of human full-body cloning.
Initially, one is struck by the notion that claims to parenthood
occasioned by surrogacy may be somewhat less difficult to handle with

whether or not the government tries to stop him. See, e.g. Richard Kaday, Go Forth and
Multiply (Interview with Dr Seed), WIRED, Mar. 1998, at 150.
90. Darwin argued:
When many of the inhabitants of any area have become modified and improved,
we can understand, on the principle of competition, and from the all-important
relations of organism to organism in the struggle for life, that any form which did
not become in some degree modified and improved, would be liable to extermination. Hence we see why all the species in the same region do at last, if we look to
long enough intervals of time, become modified, for otherwise they would become
extinct.
CHARLES DARWIN, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES BY MEANS OF NATURAL SELECTION, OR THE
PRESERVATION OF FAVOURED RACES IN THE STRUGGLE FOR LIFE 366 (Charles W. Eliot ed.,
1909).
91. But recall comments by Dr. Vidali, who stated that there probably never will be an
artificial womb that can take over a mother's from fertilization to delivery. Interview with Dr.
Andrea Vidali, supra note 80. Currently, scientists can keep a six-day-old cell as measured from
the point of fertilization (a blastocyst, see REPORT OF THE HUMAN EMBRYO RESEARCH PANEL,
supra note 8, at 9), for no longer than ten days in a cultured system. Id. The earliest "age" from
which a premature baby has survived in an incubator is twenty-four weeks and two days. Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1997

27

Florida Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 3
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

cloning than with other reproductive techniques. After all, if we ignore
the inactive mitochondrial DNA in the host egg cell, aren't the claims
of one potential parent-the egg cell donor with no wish to produce this
child-then eliminated? Yes, but unfortunately it is still conceivable to
fashion some sort of parental claim based on this mitochondrial DNA.'
Then, of course, we are faced with the claims of the cloned "parent" and
his or her spouse, which, if the nucleic material is transferred into a
gestational mother, may conflict with those of two other potential
parents: the gestational mother and, if she is married, her husband.93
Currently, surrogacy disputes are governed by a confusing hodgepodge of legal approaches at the state level.9" To understand these, it
is first necessary to distinguish genetic from gestational surrogacy. 9'
92. See NATIONAL BIOETHIcs ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 9, at 90 (stating that
"paternity acts, surrogacy statutes, and egg donation statutes are not necessarily broad enough
to address the kinship relationships involved in cloning human beings [, including that of] the
woman contributing the enucleated egg cell which contains a small fraction of DNA in the
cytoplasmic mitochondria").
93. See id. The children of assisted reproduction are "biotechnological children" (a term
used by Larry I. Palmer of Cornell University School of Law in his article Who are the Parents
of Biotechnological Children?, 35 JURIMETRICS J.17, 19 (1994)) who may have up to five
potential parents: "the sperm and egg sources (genetic parents), the woman who carries the
pregnancy and gives birth (gestator or gestational mother), and the people who will raise the
child ('functional parents' [internal cross-reference omitted])." Michelle Pierce-Gealy, Comment,
"Are You My Mother?": Ohio's Crazy-Making Baby-Making Produces a New Definition of
"Mother," 28 AKRON L. REV. 535, 542 (1995) (citing John Lawrence Hill, What Does It Mean
to Be a "Parent"?The Claims of Biology as the Basisfor ParentalRights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV.
353, 355 (1991)).
94. For example, consider the problem addressed in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S.
110 (1989). In Michael H., a married woman had an extra-marital affair and got pregnant by her
lover. See id. at 113. That man's claim to fatherhood was denied and the woman's husband--the
non-genetic father-essentially was deemed to be the child's father. See id. at 118-30.
States with statutes that "address the issue of motherhood in collaborative reproductive
arrangements" are: Arkansas, where the biological father is presumed to be the legal father and,
if he is married, the intended mother is the legal mother, even if she is not the genetic mother;
New Hampshire and North Dakota, where the woman who gives birth is presumed to be the
legal mother, "regardless of genetics" and, if she is married, her husband is rebuttably presumed
to be the father; and Virginia, where, without a judicially pre-approved contract, a woman who
gives birth is the legal mother. See Pierce-Gealy, supra note 93, at 549-51.
95. See Todd M. Krim, Beyond Baby M: International Perspectives on Gestational
Surrogacy and the Demise of the Unitary BiologicalMother, 5 ANNALS HEALTH L. 193, 194
(1996). The In re Baby M case involved "traditional" or "genetic" surrogacy, where the egg is
that of the surrogate mother. See id. In "gestational" surrogacy, the surrogate mother is merely
a host for the embryo formed from the egg of the intended mother, see id., which is usually
fertilized by the intended father's sperm.
According to statistics compiled in 1994 by the Society for Assisted Reproductive
Technology and The American Society for Reproductive Medicine with data gathered in the
United States and Canada, the success rate of delivered pregnancies for gestational surrogate
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Genetic surrogacy, made famous by the In re Baby M case,"
involves a contract whereby a woman agrees, in exchange for money,
to become impregnated through artificial insemination and to give up the
newly born child to the father. In Baby M, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey invalidated the surrogacy contract but awarded custody to the
genetic father and his wife as the intended parents, despite the pleas of
the surrogate mother who had changed her mind.97 However, "[i]n
many states, the woman who gives birth is considered to be the legal
mother and her husband [if any] the legal father of any resulting
child." 98
one woman (the 'gestational
"In gestational surrogacy ....
surrogate') agrees to be impregnated with an embryo formed from the
fertilized egg of another woman (generally the child's 'intended
mother')."99 Usually, the intended mother's egg is united with her
husband's sperm through in vitro methods, and then implanted in the
gestational surrogate's womb. However, in a variation of this procedure,
the sperm and egg are obtained from anonymous donors rather than
from the intended parents."°
Arizona and Utah have statutes making the gestational surrogate the
mother of the child even though the embryo she is gestating has no
genetic relationship to her."° ' It is unclear how many other states
which currently award parenthood to a genetic surrogate would follow
these states in the case of a purely gestational surrogate. Only in Florida,
New Hampshire, North Dakota, and Virginia are court-approved
gestational surrogacy arrangements validated by statutes to make the
intended rearing parents-not the surrogate-the legal parents." z As

mothers is 30.4% per transfer, i.e. each time the fertilized donor egg is implanted into the
surrogate mother. See Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology & The American Society
for Reproductive Medicine, Assisted Reproductive Technology in the United States and Canada:
1994 Results Generated from the American Society for Reproductive Medicine/Society for
Assisted Reproductive Technology Registry, 66 FERTILITY & STERILITY, 697, 702 (1996). The
success rate for all procedures of infertility treatments was approximately 24%. See id. at 697
(reporting a total of 9573 deliveries out of 39,390 cycles of assisted reproduction treatment).
96. 537 A.2d 1227 (1988).
97. See id. at 1250, 1258; see also Pierce-Gealy, supra note 93, at 550 (concerning the
affects of surrogacy contracts on parental rights in Virginia).
98. NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 9, at 90 n.8.
99. Krim, supra note 94, at 194.
100. See id. at 193 n.3.
101. See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218B. (West 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. §
76-7-204(3)(a) (1997).
102. See FLA. STAT. § 742.15 (1997); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B (1996); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-17 (1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158 (Michie 1997); see also NATIONAL BIOETHICS
ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 9, at 90 n.8.
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to situations where the intended rearing parents are unrelated to the
individuals whose egg or sperm is used, the contributors to such
arrangement will have various, "as yet ill-defined, legal rights and
responsibilities with respect to the resulting child."' 3
Since the law in many states is unclear about the status of contracts
regarding gestational and genetic surrogacy, cloning could be expected
to add yet another layer of uncertainty. However, if the potential rights
of the enucleated egg-cell donor founded on the trace of mitochondrial
DNA she transfers were disregarded, cloning might have some positive
effects on this morass."°
Assuming the surrogate is not the donor of the enucleated egg cell,
then the potential conflict is only between the donor of the nucleic
material (male or female) and the gestational mother and her husband,
if any. If states would follow Posner's desire that contractual surrogacy
be allowed to work through market mechanisms, 5 the nucleic donor
could simply bargain with the appropriate female to gestate the clone
and the bargain would be upheld. Such a permissive attitude by the
majority of states seems unlikely, however, raising as it does the specter
of women in the "rent a womb" business,"° not merely for more
traditionally produced embryos, but for clones.
Feminists seem particularly conflicted about women renting out their
wombs for child gestation."° On the one hand, this may be exploit-

103. See NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 9, at 90 (citations
omitted).
104. Judge Posner favors unregulated free markets for such arrangements. See Posner,
SurrogateMotherhood,supra note 30, at 22. "[S]urrogate motherhood is itself a product, in part,
of the interference with a market-the market in adoption." Id. Posner believes that surrogacy
contracts will be made as long as people on both sides of the transaction think they will realize
a gain from it. See id. The money expended by a couple where the wife cannot conceive will
be equal to the benefit derived from having a baby. See id. Likewise, the surrogate mother
believes that the money she will receive is greater than whatever medical risks and personal
discomfort and trouble she is getting into, including giving up the baby after delivery. See id.
In Posner's assessment, it is just another business deal following the law of contracts. See id.
105. See id. at 22-23.
106. See id. at 28 (discussing the argument against surrogate motherhood as just another
form of "baby selling"). For further discussion of surrogacy as another form of "baby selling,"
see Krim, supra note 95, at 215 nn.77-78 (citing Barbara Katz Rothman, On 'Surrogacy,' in
JOHN ARRAS & BONNIE STEINBOCK, ETHIcAL IssuEs INMODERN MEDICINE 475 (4th ed. 1995)).
"The comparison between [indenture] contracts [such as those where young children were hired
out as servants up until the nineteenth century and which today would be invalid] and surrogacy
contracts is obvious.... Much of the opposition to surrogacy stems from the sense that it
resembles contracts-of-indenture (or even slavery)." Dolgin, supra note 17, at 484 (citation
omitted).
107. This is a difficult paradigm for feminists: on the one hand, the womb belongs to the
woman and she should be free and empowered to make what choices she likes in respect to
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ative of female gestation. On the other, interference with a woman's
procreative and market choices would seem to be paternalistic and
inhibitory to her liberty. 10 8 The former position, when coupled with the
reality that the "exploited" woman would be bearing a clone-not a
traditional embryo-might put a damper on any drive to use surrogates
in the cloning process, particularly when the views of the right to life
movement are factored in.
Thus, all in all, the necessity of a surrogate to gestate the clone
might militate against the use of cloning, even in couples. This
possibility leads us to consider whether, by the time human whole-body
cloning is perfected as a means of assisted reproduction, an artificial
womb might have been created to gestate the clone. One might
hypothesize that the artificial womb's removal of the difficulties
associated with surrogacy could lead to a more favorable climate for the
acceptance of cloning as a reproductive method. However, such a womb
seems not to be on the immediate horizon and, given the political
ramifications of eliminating the need for a female in the gestation
process, may be quite far in the future. One questions whether there is
sufficient market demand to drive the development of such a complex
machine. Even if there were such machines, they would likely be
extremely expensive, due to their seemingly limited potential use. 1"

reproduction; on the other hand, as Deborah Lynn Steinberg remarked about IVF, if assisted
reproduction (and therefore surrogacy) "assumes a disproportionate burden of commitment from
women, it also involves the assumption that women should bear the entire burden of physical
risk." STEINBERG, supra note 57, at 50.
Gena Corea, a feminist who opposes surrogacy, is concerned that the new reproductive
techniques are leaving women behind, robbing them of the traditional motherhood experience
because they and their experience are dominated by men. See COREA, supra note 10, at 289.
"Woman's claim to maternity is being loosened; man's claim to paternity strengthened." Id.
Some feminists place a lot of importance on the nurturing aspect of pregnancy, as compared
to the genetics of it, pointing out that we still do not know for sure what ties develop in utero
between the baby and the mother. "[U]sing genes as the determinant of parenthood mimics a
male style of parenting in which blood ties are more important than the effort and responsibility
of care giving." Katheryn D. Katz, Ghost Mothers: Hwnan Egg Donation and the Legacy of the
Past, 57 ALB. L. REV. 733, 748 (1994). For an historical perspective on feminist views on
surrogacy, see Krim, supra note 95, at 221-25.
108. See Posner, supra note 30, at 28.
109. Having a limited number of expensive machines of course raises issues of access. For
example, desire to clone would seem a lower priority than, for example, that of making the
machine available to women reproducing coitally who cannot proceed with gestation after seven
to eight weeks.
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VI. INHERITANCE RIGHTS OF CLONES
For purposes of inheritance and support during life, clones should be
treated the same as other children born alive to two living parents.
Difficulties might arise as to inheritance,"' however, if the cloned preimplantation embryo were frozen for later use.
In my previous article, I argued that a child created from frozen
sperm after the father's death should be able to inherit from the father
by a properly drafted will; or, if not mentioned in the will, as a
pretermitted heir; or, if there is no will, by intestacy."' In the latter
two cases, I sought to demonstrate the advantage of having a statute of
limitations on such a child's claim to a share, such as two years from
the testator's death plus 300 days (the latter representing the presumed
period of gestation).'
Cloning will result in a pre-implantation embryo which can itself be
frozen for later use. If the parent dies before the embryo is implanted in
a woman's uterus, neither the common law nor the Uniform Probate
Code (U.P.C.) currently allows such a child to inherit from that
parent."' The child is treated the same as if it were conceived after the
death of the father from the frozen embryo." 4
Only a few states have statutes regarding the parentage or inheritance
rights of children conceived or implanted after death. A Louisiana
statute, for example, provides that a human embryo cannot receive a gift
unless it has been implanted in a womb prior to the testator's death."'
In North Dakota, however, a statute states that a parent who dies before
a conception using that parent's sperm or egg is not the parent of the
resulting child for inheritance or other purposes." 6 An argument can
be made that a pre-implantation embryo has already been conceived if
one takes the common view that conception occurs at the point of
fertilization. If, however, one reads this statute in light of the American
Medical Association definition of conception, which is completed at

110. Inheritance and other post-mortem support mechanisms, such as the family allowance,
are not dealt with in this Article.
111. See Chester, supra note 1, at 987-88.
112. See id. at 988-1012.

113. See U.P.C. § 2-108 (1993) (providing only for inheritance by relatives conceived prior
to the decedent's death); Christine A. Djalleta, Comment, A Twinkle in a Decedent's Eye:
ProposedAmendments to the Uniform Probate Code in Light of New Reproductive Technology,
67 TEMP. L. REV. 335, 344 (1994) (stating that, "[i]f interpreted literally, neither the common

law nor the U.P.C. allows a child conceived or implanted after the testator's death to inherit").
114. See id.
115. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 1474 cmt. (West 1993).
116. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-04 (1992).
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implantation,"' the child probably would not inherit because the parent
died before conception was complete.
The official text of the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted
Conception Act (U.S.C.A.C.A.), on which the statutes of North Dakota
and Virginia.. are based, uses clearer language: "[A]n individual who
dies before implantation of an embryo... is not a parent of the
resulting child. 119 The official comment adds that a person could
explicitly provide for a child implanted after his or her death via a
will." ° Virginia's version is likewise clear that implantation is the key
time at which the parent must be alive, but adds that a child born of an
unimplanted gamete or pre-implantation embryo can inherit if the adult
consents
to be a parent in a writing executed before the implanta21
tion.1
In order to give cloned pre-implantation embryos inheritance rights,
I would treat all unimplanted embryos just as I suggested treating frozen
sperm. To inherit, children born from (usually frozen) pre-implantation
embryos implanted after the parent's death would have to be born
within, for example, two years of the parent's death plus 300 days. In
the typical case, within the limitations period, the wife could use the
frozen pre-implantation embryo cloned from her dead husband just as
she could have used his frozen sperm to produce a child. The child thus
conceived would be entitled to inherit from the dead father under my
proposed scheme.
If the question were the child's inheritance rights from his or her
dead mother, then the gestational surrogate would have two years and
300 days to produce a child entitled to inherit from that mother. Since
most states have not resolved the issue of whether the gestational
surrogate or the genetic mother is the parent, the surrogate wishing to
be a parent may prevail in a particular state, thus cutting off inheritance
rights to and from the genetic mother. Under the plan I have suggested,
the resulting child would have no inheritance rights from a nonconsenting spouse or non-adopting partner. This result is yet another
reason that the states might wish to require consent or adoption by the
non-consenting or non-adopting spouse or partner before allowing
cloning at all.' " As indicated earlier, I hope the law on the parenting
117. See supra note 66.
118. See Djalleta, supra note 113, at 345.
119. See U.S.C.A.C.A. § 4(b) cmt. (1988). U.S.C.A.C.A. § 9B gives choices to states to
validate surrogacy contracts with judicial approval before conception or invalidate such contracts.
U.S.C.A.C.A. § 10 fixes the inheritance rights of children.
120. See id. § 4(b) cmt.
121. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158 (Michie 1993).
122. If consent or adoption by a partner were required in order to clone, the state would
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rights of gestational surrogates will become clearer in most states by the
time human cloning becomes available.
VII. CONCLUSION

The comments and suggestions made in this Article regarding the
parental and inheritance issues that may arise with the advent of human
whole-body cloning are by necessity both preliminary and tentative. The
first matter society must internalize is that generally, cloning, with or
without government aid, probably will be upon us in five to seven years.
Thus, the President's National Bioethics Advisory Commission is only
recommending a holding action by suggesting no human experimentation for three to five years. By the end of that period, animal experimentation may be so advanced, or "off-shore" human experiments may be
themselves sufficiently perfected, to cause the government to take a
second look. At that time, the government might recommend that careful
steps be taken to perfect, within ethical, moral, and legal guidelines, a
clinical procedure for the whole-body cloning of humans.
Acceptance of this reality may be difficult for many of us. Moral and
religious objections should be respected to the extent possible. Once the
clinical procedure becomes relatively safe, however, it would seem that
the majority of us must get on with the tricky business of regulating it.
As the political debate sharpens, we as a society may be able to choose
a widely acceptable point at which to begin protecting life within the
time-frame that modem biology has given us. As this point moves
further away from simple fertilization of the egg, some of the ethical
and religious problems we are now having with the destruction of preimplantation embryos in cloning and other assisted conception techniques may be eased. Simultaneously, we should by then be coming to
understand that cloning for human reproduction need not involve the
horrific "brave new world" scenarios some are painting."
Clones, after all, will be unique human beings undergoing very
different social experiences from their parents. They have not been
"genetically altered" to create a "master race"; their genomes will
seemingly have to ban cloning by unattached individuals as well. Certainly, the person wanting
to clone should not be treated differently from the unattached individual, simply because his or
her partner refuses to adopt the clone. There may be, however, policy reasons to refuse cloning
to marriedindividuals whose spouses refuse to consent to the cloning, while allowing unattached
individuals, whose cloning would not stimulate intra-family disputes, to use the procedure.
123. Consider, for example, the following: "Cloning, like eugenics generally, would
produce, as C.S. Lewis wrote, 'one dominant age.., which resists all previous ages most
successfully and dominates all subsequent ages most irresistibly.' ... [H]umanity is supposed
to be an endless chain, not a series of mirrors." George F. Will, Golly, Dolly! It the Abolition
of Man, BALTIMORE SUN, Feb. 26, 1997, at 11A.
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simply be copies of ones already in existence. Moreover, cloning
probably will be used primarily when other means of assisted conception
work poorly or not at all. Thus, I cannot foresee a situation where
cloning for human reproduction becomes so widespread as to threaten
the proper adaptation of our species under the principles of natural
selection.
As our fear of the unknown begins to dissipate, we can begin the
arduous process of legally regulating cloning procedures. It is in the
hope that this time will soon come that this very preliminary Article is
offered. Once we come to grips with those of our fears that are
groundless, we can begin the task of confronting the real problems that
such advances pose. To do this, it is best to prepare now-to begin the
dialogue which will allow us better to control, through legal means and
otherwise, the shape of the human future, including those parts of it
which science makes possible.
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